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INTRODUCTION 
For over 20 years, online service providers have relied upon an 
established body oflaw interpreting Section 230 of the Communications 
Decency Act ("Section 230" or the "CDA"), which delineates the extent to 
which they can or cannot be responsible for the activities of third-party 
users. The Court of Appeals broke with decades of case law interpreting the 
CDA as a broad immunity for the "traditional editorial functions" of online 
service providers, and instead adopted an idiosyncratic "plain language 
interpretation" that Section 230 does not protect the "design and operation 
of website features." The untenable result is that the CDA now means 
something different in Wisconsin than it does everywhere else. 
The Computer and Communications Industry Association ("CCIA") 
is comprised of companies in the high-technology products and services 
sectors-companies that provide a broad range of online services to billions 
of people around the world. Although CCIA takes no position on whether 
Defendants in this case are protected by Section 230, it is imperative that 
this Court reject the Court of Appeals' unprecedented interpretation-and 
thereby ensure national uniformity in the application-of this vital federal 
statute. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. CONGRESS DETERMINED THAT TRADITIONAL ST AND ARDS OF 
PUBLISHER AND DISTRIBUTOR LIABILITY SHOULD NOT APPLY ON 
THE INTERNET 
Section 230 "immunizes providers of interactive computer services 
against liability arising from content created by third parties." Jones v. 
Dirty World Entm 't Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 406 (6th Cir. 2014). 
Section 230( c)(l) mandates that "[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any 
infonnation provided by another information content provider." 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230( c )(1 ). Subject to limited exceptions, "[ n Jo cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section." Id. § 230(e)(3). 
"Section 230 was enacted, in part, to maintain the robust nature of 
Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep government interference 
in the medium to a minimum." Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330 ( 4th Cir. 1997). Congress understood that if online providers were 
subject to traditional publisher or distributor liability whenever third-party 
infonnation is posted to, or accessible through, their services, they would 
be forced to investigate each and every notice of potentially unlawful 
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activity. "Although this might be feasible for the traditional print publisher, 
the sheer number of postings on interactive computer services would create 
an impossible burden in the Internet context." Id. at 333. As the Sixth 
Circuit has explained, barring publisher liability against online services 
"serves three main purposes. First, it maintains the robust nature of Internet 
communication and, accordingly, keeps govermnent interference in the 
medium to a minimum .... Second, the immunity provided by§ 230 protects 
against the 'heckler's veto' that would chill free speech .... Third, § 230 
encourages interactive computer service providers to self-regulate." Jones, 
755 F.3d at 407-08 (citations omitted) . 
II. SECTION 230 IMMUNIZES ONLINE SERVICE PROVIDERS FROM 
CLAIMS ARISING FROM CONTENT POSTED BY THIRD PARTIES 
"Both state and federal courts around the country have generally 
interpreted Section 230 immunity broadly, so as to effectuate Congress's 
policy choice ... not to deter harmful online speech through the ... route of 
imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for other 
parties' potentially injurious messages[.]" Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of 
NY., Inc., 17 N.Y.3d 281,288 (2011) (citations omitted). Countless courts 
have interpreted Section 230 to bar "any cause of action that would make 
service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user 
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of the service." Jones, 755 F.3d at 406-07 (emphasis added; citations 
omitted; collecting cases): 
[M]any causes of action might be premised on the publication or 
speaking of what one might call "information content." A provider of 
information services might get sued for violating anti-discrimination 
laws, for fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and ordinary negligence, for 
false light, or even for negligent publication of advertisements that cause 
harm to third parties. Thus, what matters is not the name of the cause of 
action---defamation versus negligence versus intentional infliction of 
emotional distress-what matters is whether the cause of action 
inherently requires the court to treat the defendant as the "publisher or 
speaker" of content provided by another. 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101-02 (9th Cir. 2009) (citations 
omitted). 
Under this standard, virtually every court to have interpreted Section 
230 has held that it bars "lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable 
for its exercise of a publisher' s traditional editorial functions-such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content" that they 
did not themselves create. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; accord, e.g. , Jones, 755 
F.3d at 407 (immunizing a service provider's exercise of "traditional 
editorial functions" goes to the "core" of Section 230). 1 
1 Far from being "discredited," as Plaintiff claims without any support (Pl. Br. at 39), 
Zeran is widely considered to be the "leading case on section 230 immunity." Hassell v. 
Bird, 5 Cal. 5th 522, 535 (2018) (quoting Barrett v. Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33, 41, 46 
(2006) ("The Zeran court's views have been broadly accepted, in both federal and state 
courts.")); accord, e.g., Courtney v. Vereb, No. 12-655, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286, at 
*8 (E.D. La. June 21 , 2012) (Zeran is "[o]ne of the most important and oft-cited cases on 
CDA immunity"). 
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Ill. THE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED SECTION 230 
A. The Decision Below Misinterprets the CDA as a Narrow 
Immunity That Cannot Protect the "Design and 
Operation" of a Website 
The Court of Appeals in this case broke from this established 
consensus. The Court instead engaged in an idiosyncratic-and 
unprecedented-interpretation of Section 230, finding only a "narrow 
scope of immunity" applied directly to user communications themselves . 
Op.~~ 27, 34, 42, 47 & n.5. It refused to apply Section 230 because 
Plaintiff does not (in the Court's view) "seek to hold Armslist liable for 
publishing another's information content. Instead, the claims seek to hold 
Armslist liable for its own alleged actions in designing and operating its 
website in ways that caused injuries to Daniel," i.e., by "facilitat[ing] illegal 
firearms purchases" between third parties communicating on the site. Id. ~~ 
3, 19, 51-52 ( emphasis added). 
That approach has been rejected by every court to have considered 
it. As court after com1 has explained, "Section 230( c )(I) is implicated not 
only by claims that explicitly point to third party content but also by claims 
which, though artfully pleaded to avoid direct reference, implicitly require 
recourse to that content to establish liability or implicate a defendant's role, 
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broadly defined, in publishing or excluding third party communications." 
Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 155-58 (E.D.N.Y. 2017) 
( emphasis added) (barring claims that Facebook "contributed to" unlawful 
conduct by allowing persons to create accounts and post offensive content 
on its service, because "Facebook's role in publishing [third-party] content 
is thus an essential causal element of the claims"); see also, e.g., FTC v. 
Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument 
that CDA did not cover a website's "conduct" in facilitating the posting of 
confidential telephone information, "rather than for the content of the 
information," because ultimately the website "would not have violated the 
FTCA had it not 'published' the confidential telephone information"); 
Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1164-65 (N.D. Cal. 2017) 
(rejecting argument that CDA does not bar claims alleging "provision of 
material support" to persons inciting violence online, because "[t]his 
argument essentially tries to divorce [a third party's] offensive content from 
the ability to post such content"); Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 
(5th Cir. 2008) (noting "fallacy" in plaintiffs' argument that "they only seek 
to hold MySpace liable for its failure to implement measures that would 
have prevented" minors from communicating on the site, because "[t]heir 
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allegations are merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable for 
publishing the communications and they speak to MySpace's role as a 
publisher of online third-party-generated content"). 
Accordingly, it is well settled that "decisions as to the 'structure and 
operation' of a website ... fall within Section 230(c)(l)'s protection[.]" 
Cohen, 252 F. Supp. 3d at 156-57. Courts uniformly hold that the CDA 
"address[es] the structure and operation of [a defendant's] website, that is, 
[defendant's] decisions about how to treat postings .... Features such as 
these, which reflect choices about what content can appear on the website 
and in what form, are editorial choices that fall within the purview of 
traditional publisher functions." Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 
16-17, 21 (1st Cir. 2016) (barring claim that defendant structured website to 
facilitate unlawful user transactions); see also, e.g., Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. 
v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 256-58 (4th Cir. 2009) 
( defendant immunized from claim that "structure and design of its website" 
facilitated tortious content); Universal Commc 'n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 
478 F.3d 413, 418-22 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Lycos's decision not to reduce 
misinformation by changing its web site policies was as much an editorial 
decision with respect to that misinfonnation as a decision not to delete a 
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particular posting."); Dyro.ff'v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., No. l 7-cv-
05359-LB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524, at *18-19 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 26, 
2017) (rejecting plaintiffs attempt to "plead around§ 230(c)(I) immunity 
by basing their claims on the website's tools, rather than the website 
operator's role as a publisher of the third-party content"); Herrick v. 
Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588-93 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("Herrick's 
claim that Grindr is liable because it failed to incorporate adequate 
protections against impersonating or fake accounts is just another way of 
asserting that Grindr is liable because it fails to police and remove 
impersonating content .... [T]hese features ( or the lack of additional 
capabilities) are ... exactly the sort of 'editorial choices' that are a function 
of being a publisher.") ( citations omitted); Gonzalez, 282 F. Supp. 3d at 
1166 (barring claim that "functionality" of Y ouTube' s service "enhance[ d] 
[third-paiiy's] ability to conduct [unlawful] operations"); Fields v. Twitter, 
Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1124 (N.D. Cal. 2016) ("Twitter's decisions to 
structure and operate itself as a platform ... reflect choices about what 
[third-party] content can appear on [Twitter] and in what fonn. Where such 
choices form the basis of a plaintiffs claim, section 230(c)(l) applies.") 
( citations omitted). 
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Here, however, the Court of Appeals tried to divorce the "design and 
operation" of Defendants' website from claims based on third-party content 
posted on that site, and Plaintiffs echo this mistake in their arguments to 
this Court. Their claims only underscore the logical "fallacy" of that 
distinction. MySpace, 528 F.3d at 420. Plaintiffs' theory is that an online 
platfonn "is liable for designing and operating its website in a way that 
encouraged prohibited sales[.]" Op. ,i 35. But, of course, those sales were 
only "encouraged" because the website's "features" enabled users to 
connect and communicate with one another on the site. Id. 1113, 19. Thus, 
Plaintiffs are ultimately seeking to hold a website liable for its role in 
facilitating third-party communications. Id. Without those communications, 
there could be no claim of liability. 
At bottom, then, Plaintiffs' arguments are premised on the notion 
that a website can be held liable for the actions of its users where it, 
allegedly, did not do enough to stop those users from posting 
advertisements that might result in unlawful sales. That theory does exactly 
what Section 230 forbids: premise liability on the choices an online service 
provider makes about what "information provided by another information 
content provider" should or should not appear on its site. Imposing liability 
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on such core publisher activity impermissibly treats the service provider as 
the "publisher or speaker" of material supplied by its users. Under the 
correct interpretation of the statute, Section 230 applies to any claims that 
"can be boiled down to the failure of an interactive computer service to edit 
or block user-generated content that it believes was tendered for posting 
online, as that is the very activity Congress sought to immunize by passing 
the section." Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 
1172 n.32 (9th Cir. 2008). 
B. The Court of Appeals Should Have Applied the "Material 
Contribution Test" to Determine Whether Defendants are 
"Information Content Providers" 
No one suggests that Section 230 immunity is unlimited. "[A]n 
interactive computer service that is also an 'information content provider' 
of certain content is not immune from liability arising from publication of 
that content." Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197. Accordingly, instead of 
discarding Section 230 outright based on a false distinction between a 
website's "content" and "design," the Court of Appeals should have 
followed established law to determine whether Defendants are themselves 
"information content provider[s]" and therefore "responsible, in whole or in 
part," for creating or developing illegality. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3). 
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Under the "material contribution" test, "a website helps to develop 
unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it 
contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct." 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167-68. Importantly, however, a "material 
contribution to the alleged illegality of the content does not mean merely 
taking action that is necessary to the display of allegedly illegal content. 
Rather, it means being responsible for what makes the displayed content 
allegedly unlawful." Jones, 755 F.3d at 410. The service must have 
contributed to the illegality intentionally, such as in Roommates.com where 
the defendant (which had been sued for soliciting discriminatory 
information in violation of the Fair Housing Act) deliberately "designed its 
system to use allegedly unlawful criteria so as to limit the results of each 
search, and to force users to participate in its discriminatory process." 521 
F.3d at 1167. By contrast, merely "providing neutral tools to carry out what 
may be unlawful or illicit searches does not amount to 'development' for 
purposes of the immunity exception." Id. at 1169 ( emphasis added); see 
also Jones, 755 F.3d at 416. 
As another example, in FTC v. Accusearch, the Tenth Circuit held 
that "a service provider is 'responsible' for the development of offensive 
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content only if it in some way specifically encourages development of what 
is offensive about the content." 570 F.3d at 1199. The comi held that the 
defendant, which had actively solicited and paid for confidential telephone 
records to be posted and sold on its website, was "not 'neutral' with respect 
to generating offensive content; on the contrary, its actions were intended to 
generate such content." Id. at 1201 (emphasis added). 
Courts around the country have applied this framework in a variety 
of contexts, including in cases like this one, where defendants allegedly 
"knew or should have known" that website "functionalities" might facilitate 
unlawful transactions between users. E.g., Dyro.ff, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
194524, at * 19-29 ("Ultimate Software's functionalities are neutral tools 
that do not transform Ultimate Software into an 'information content 
provider,' even (f the tools were used to .facilitate unlawful activities on the 
site. Ultimate Software's policy about anonymity may have allowed illegal 
conduct, and the neutral tools .facilitated user communications, but these 
website functionalities do not 'create' or 'develop' information, even in 
part.") ( emphases added; citations omitted). 
The "material contribution" test was also applied in a case invoked 
by Plaintiff, JS. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC, where it was 
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alleged that defendant intentionally designed its website to facilitate 
unlawful transactions between users. 359 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Wash. 2015) 
("It is important to ascertain whether in fact Backpage designed its posting 
rules to induce sex trafficking to determine whether Backpage is subject to 
suit under the CDA because 'a website helps to develop unlawful content, 
and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes 
materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct."') ( quoting 
Roommates. com). 
While CCIA takes no position on the outcome of the "material 
contribution" test when properly applied in this case, the Court of Appeals 
departed from established law by ignoring that test and jettisoning any 
possible Section 230 protection, simply because (in its view) Plaintiff seeks 
to hold Defendants responsible for the "design and operation" of their 
website. The Court itself admitted that this idiosyncratic view conflicts with 
authority throughout the country. Op. ,i,i 34-36, 48-51. 
Indeed, even the cases the Court of Appeals considered "persuasive" 
do not support its analysis. Id. ,i,i 45-46. The Court relied heavily upon a 
concurring opinion in JS., but ignored the majority's use of the "material 
contribution" test. 359 P.3d at 717-18. The Comi also invoked Barnes, 
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which found that a defendant's contractual promise to remove content may 
waive the CDA safe harbor, but otherwise endorsed a broad immunity 
covering "a publisher's traditional editorial functions," such as "reviewing, 
editing, and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication 
third-party content." 570 F.3d at 1101-02. 
Plaintiff, too, cites cases that supposedly embrace a "narrow 
construction of the CDA." Pl. 's Br. at 31-34. None of them actually do. The 
vast majority featured allegations that defendants themselves created or 
actively solicited unlawful content (Bay Pare Plaza Apartments, Congoo, 
Opperman, Perkins, Moving & Storage, Stevo Design, LeanSpa, 
CYBERsitter, Fraley, A/vi Armani Medical, Anthony, Hy Cite, MCW, Huon, 
Backpage JI). Others concerned ordinances or private suits that did not 
involve third-party content (Doe v. Internet Brands, StubHub!, Airbnb, 
Homeaway.com, Sigler, Maynard, McDonald). None of those cases found 
that the "design and operation" of a website falls outside the CDA, 
irrespective of whether it "contributes materially" to illegality, or merely 
offers "neutral tools" to third pa1iies. On that, the Court of Appeals stands 
entirely alone. And its approach is neither compelled by the text of the 
statute nor compatible with the enormous body of robust Section 230 case 
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law. This Court should bring Wisconsin in line with this long-established 
consensus. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision below broke with two decades of established case law 
and threatens to substantially erode the protections that Section 230 affords 
to all service providers-not just Defendants. Unless reversed, plaintiffs 
with creative lawyers will come to Wisconsin to exploit this loophole and 
pursue claims that have consistently been understood as prohibited in every 
other state. 
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Courtney v. Vereb 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana 
June 21, 2012, Decided; June 25, 2012, Filed 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 12-655 SECTION: A(4) 
Reporter 
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87286 *; 2012 WL 2405313 
JOHN C. COURTNEY, PSY.D, MP versus DR. 
BARTHOLOMEW VEREB AND ANGIE'S LIST, 
INC. 
Counsel: [*1] For John C Courtney, Psy.D., MP, 
Plaintiff: Nakisha Ervin-Knott, LEAD 
ATTORNEY, Justin I. Woods, Gainsburgh, 
Benjamin, David, Meunier & Warshauer, New 
Orleans, LA. 
For Bartholomew Vereb, Dr., Defendant: Alan J. 
Yacoubian, LEAD ATTORNEY, Neal J. Favret, 
Johnson, Johnson, Barrios & Yacoubian, New 
Orleans, LA. 
For Angies List, Incorporated, Defendant: Kyle 
Potts, LEAD ATTORNEY, David C. Coons, 
Jaimme A. Collins, Adams & Reese, LLP (New 
Orleans), New Orleans, LA. 
Judges: JAY C. ZAINEY, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE. 
Opinion by: JAY C. ZAINEY 
Opinion 
ORDER AND REASONS 
Before the Comi is a Motion to Dismiss (Rec. 
Doc. 8) filed by Defendant Angie's List, Inc. 
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(6), arguing that 
Plaintiff's claims are barred by the 1996 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 
("CDA''). Plaintiff Dr. John C. Courtney opposes 
the motion (Rec. Doc. 12). The motion, set for 
hearing on May 23, 2012, is before the Court on the 
briefs without oral argument. For the following 
reasons, the motion is GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This case stems from allegedly defamatory 
comments which Plaintiff Dr. John Courtney 
contends that Defendant Dr. Bartholomew Vereb 
made about him on a web page owned by 
Defendant Angie's List, Inc. [*2] Angie's List 1 
describes itself as "an online c01mnunity for 
members to find service companies and health care 
professionals in markets across the country. 
Members share their experiences about businesses/ 
professionals from over 500 service categories, 
including doctors, carpet cleaners, handymen, 
landscapers, and caterers." See Rec. Doc. 8, p. 1. 
Angie's List advertises that it certifies its data 
before disseminating its reports to the public. It 
states on its website: "Before they're posted, all 
reviews are checked in order to guard against 
providers and companies that try to report on them 
or their competitors." 2 
Plaintiff alleges that, on June 2, 2009, Dr. Vereb 
"intentionally and maliciously, posted false and 
defamatory comments" about Dr. Courtney's 
professional services. See Plaintiff's Complaint at 
iii! IO and 19. According to the complaint, Dr. 
Vereb is a licensed physician, practicing psychiatry 
in Bradenton, Florida. He is also simultaneously 
licensed as a physician in Louisiana with a defined 
practice in psychiatry. Plaintiff states that, contrary 
1 http://www.angieslist.com. 
2 See http://www.angieslist.com/howitworks.aspx. 
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to Dr. Vereb's negative comments, Dr. Courtney 
had never 1*3] met nor treated Dr. Vereb or 
anyone in Dr. Vereb's family. 
Plaintiff purportedly became aware of the negative 
postings in "late December of 2011." & at ~ 8. 
According to Plaintiff, he immediately contacted 
Angie's List via its online internal complaint form 
to request that it not disseminate Dr. Vereb's 
comments; however, Plaintiff received no response 
from Angie's List. Dr. Com1ney alleges that he 
repeatedly advised Angie's List that the contents of 
the report were false and requested their removal 
over the course of several months. Plaintiff asserts 
that Angie's List eventually responded and 
recommended that Dr. Courtney post a response to 
Dr. Vereb's comments, which he did. Plaintiff 
continued to request the removal of the comments, 
however. 
Plaintiff states that, on Febmary 8, 2012, he 
received an e-mail from an Angie's List 
representative stating that Angie's List had removed 
Dr. Vereb's comments because it had discovered 
that Dr. Vereb operates in the same field as Dr. 
Courtney and Angie's List does not allow 
businesses to report on themselves or competitors. 
Dr. Courtney subsequently filed suit against both 
Angie's List and Dr. Vereb in federal court. It is 
undisputed that 1*4] this Court has subject matter 
jurisdiction over the instant matter pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1332 in that the claims asserted are against 
defendants with citizenship other than that of the 
plaintiff and because the amount in controversy 
exceeds $75,000.000, exclusive of interests and 
costs. 
Plaintiff's stated cause of action against Angie's List 
is that Angie's List, as "marketer, publisher, 
distributor and/or seller" of the information posted 
online, "owed a duty to the Plaintiff to certify its 
data and to verify the contents of any negative 
posting that purports to be factual statements." Id. 
at ~ii 28-29. Dr. Courtney alleges that Angie's List 
was negligent in failing to verify the truth of Dr. 
Vereb's reviews, which is "contrary to their own 
stated policy of certifying data." Id. at ii 31. 
According to Dr. Courtney, "Angie's List's 
publication of the defamatory comments to third 
parties was malicious since it knew or should have 
known that the comments were false." Id. at ~ 34. 
Dr. Courtney has requested a trial by jury, and 
seeks compensatory damages for past and future 
mental pain and suffering, past and future economic 
loss, past and future loss of earning capacity, as 
well as all [*SJ general, special, incidental and 
consequential damages as may be proven at the 
time oftrial. Id. at~ 35. 
Angie's List brings this Motion to Dismiss (Rec. 
Doc. 8) based on the argument that Plaintiff's 
claims against it are precluded by the 1996 
Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. §230 
("CDA"). Having considered the record, the 
memoranda of counsel and the law, the Court has 
detennined that dismissal is appropriate for the 
following reasons. 
11. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) authorizes a dismissal of a 
complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted." A 12(b )( 6) motion should be 
granted only if it appears beyond doubt that the 
plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his 
claim that would entitle him to relief. See Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S. Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed. 
2d 80 ( 1957). Before dismissal is granted, the court 
must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view 
them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. 
apita l Parks. Inc. v. Southeastern Advertising and 
Sales Sys., Inc., 30 F.3d 627, 629 (5th Cir. 1994). A 
court need not, however, accept as true allegations 
that are conclusory in nature. Kai er Aluminum & 
Cb m Sa le , Inc. v. A vondaJe Shipyards, Inc., 677 
F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982). 
III. [*6] LAW & ANALYSIS 
A. Th l'urpos and History of the CDA 
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To determine if Angie's List is immune from the 
claims brought against it by Plaintiff based on the 
provisions of the CDA, it is helpful to understand 
the rationale for the statute. By passing the CDA, 
Congress recognized the ever increasing role that 
the internet plays in worldwide communication. 
See Smith v. Intercosmos Media ,roup, Jn ., 2002 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, 2002 WL 31844907 at *2 
(E.D.La., Dec. 17, 2002). Congress pointed to "the 
availability of educational and informational 
resources to our citizens" that the internet provides. 
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230). It also hailed the 
internet as "a forum for a true diversity of political 
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual 
activity" & 
Congress saw the burgeoning internet as a benefit 
to all Americans. It also recognized that one reason 
the internet played such a beneficial role in 
American society was that the internet flourished 
"with a minimum of government regulation." Id. 
With the CDA, Congress made it an official policy 
of the United States "to promote the continued 
development of the internet and other interactive 
media, unfettered by federal I *7] or state 
regulation." Id. Clearly, the purpose of the CDA is 
to promote the free flow of information on the 
internet. 
To ensure that web site operators and other 
interactive computer services would not be crippled 
by lawsuits ansmg out of third-party 
communications, the Act provides interactive 
computer services with immunity. Doe v. 
MySpace, Inc., 474 F.Supp.2d 843, 847 (W.D.Tex. 
2007) (citing Dimeo v. Max, 433 F.Supp.2d 523, 
528 (E.D.Pa. 2006) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted)). Congress provided immunity 
to "interactive computer service" providers for 
statements created by third parties but 
disseminated, and thus, published, by internet 
services. Unlike newspapers, radio stations, and 
other traditional media, under the CDA, websites 
may not be held liable for defamatory statements 
posted or sent through their services. R. L. Lael ner. 
Inc. v. Sanchez, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40388, 
2005 WL 3359356 at *2 (S.D.Tex., Dec. 9, 
2005)(citing Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F.Supp. 
44, 49 (D.D.C.1998)). However, individuals who 
create defamatory statements may be held liable 
even if the offending comments are published by 
posting on the internet. Id . 
The CDA defines an "interactive computer service" 
as "any infonnation f*8] service, system, or access 
software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer 
server, including specifically a service or system 
that provides access to the Internet." 47 U.S.C. § 
230(£)(2). The statute identifies an "infonnation 
content provider" as "any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer service." 
47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). The CDA inununizes 
providers and users of "interactive computer 
services" from liability for the information 
provided by a third party "information content 
provider." 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). 
One of the most important and oft-cited cases on 
CDA immunity to date is Zeran v. Ame1ica Online, 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997). In Zeran, the 
victim of a vicious prank sued America Online, Inc. 
("AOL") for failing to remove a false advertisement 
offering t-shirts featuring tasteless slogans related 
to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and 
instructing interested buyers to call the plaintiff to 
place an order. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 329. After 
receiving death threats from people who were 
outraged by the ad, Zeran [*9] learned of the prank 
and demanded that AOL remove the ad from its 
bulletin board and post a retraction. Id. AOL failed 
to remove the original ad, and the unidentified 
poster also posted several more ads listing the 
plaintiff's phone number. Id. A local radio station 
learned of the ads and encouraged its listeners to 
' harass Zeran. Id. The volume and intensity of the 
threats became so severe that local police guarded 
Zeran's home to protect his safety. Id. 
CCIA App . 3 
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Zeran sued AOL for negligence because it failed to 
remove the ad after specific notice of its falsity and 
allowed the third party to post additional ads after 
Zeran had put AOL on notice of his harassment and 
bodily danger. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal of the claims on the pleadings, explaining 
that the CDA necessarily protects interactive 
computer services from liability even after they are 
notified of an allegedly defamatory or threatening 
post because the insupportable legal burden 
imposed by potential t011 liability would undermine 
the CDA's goal of promoting speech on the 
Internet. Id. at 330. The Court explained that "[b ]y 
its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity 
to any cause of action that would make 
[*10] service providers liable for infonnation 
originating with a third-party user of the service." 
Id. In enacting the CDA, "Congress made a policy 
choice ... not to deter hannful online speech 
through the separate route of imposing tort liability 
on companies that serve as intermediaries for other 
parties' potentially injurious messages." Id. at 330-
31. 
Three other federal courts of appeals have also held 
that the CDA immunizes computer service 
providers from liability for information that 
originates with third parties. Doe v. Bates, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, 2006 WL 3813758 at *12 
(E.D.Tex., Dec. 27, 2006)(citing Carafano v. 
Metro ·pla b.com Jnc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th 
Cir. 2003)(noting that the Ninth Circuit in Batzel v. 
Smith, 333 F.3d 1018 (9th Cir. 2003) had "joined 
the consensus developing across other courts of 
appeals that § 230( c) provides broad immunity for 
publishing content provided primarily by third 
parties"); reen v. Ame1ica Onl.ine, 318 F.3d 465, 
4 71 (3d Cir. 2003)(upholding immunity for the 
transmission of defamatory messages and a 
program designed to disrupt the recipient's 
computer); Ben Ezra. Weinstein, & C . v. America 
Online, Inc ., 206 F.3d 980, 985-86 (10th Cir. 
2000)(upholding immunity 1*11] for the on-line 
provision of stock infonnation even though AOL 
communicated frequently with the stock quote 
providers and had occasionally deleted stock 
symbols and other information from its database in 
an effort to correct errors)). 
B. Defendant May Claim Immunity Under the 
CDA 
The CDA states that "[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any infonnation provided 
by another information content provider." 4 7 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). In Smith v. Intercosmos M edia 
Group, Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24251, 2002 
WL 31844907 (E.D.La., Dec. 17, 2002), a com1 of 
this district employed a three-part test to determine 
whether a defendant could properly claim immunity 
under the CDA. Judge Berrigan held that, for 
purposes of CDA immunity: 1) the party claiming 
the immunity must be a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service; 2) the alleged 
defamatory statement must be made by a third 
party; 3) the defamation claim the party seeks 
immunity from must treat the interactive computer 
service as the publisher or speaker of the alleged 
defamatory statement. Smith, 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 24251, 2002 WL 31844907 at *2. 
Here, Plaintiff seeks to impose tort liability on a 
company that functions [*12] as an intennediary 
by providing a forum for the exchange of 
information between third party users. See Doe v. 
Myspace, 474 F.Supp. 2d at 848. In his opposition, 
Plaintiff contends that Angie's List cannot be 
granted immunity under the CDA because it is not 
merely just an "interactive computer service," but 
also provides copies of posted reviews to 
consumers upon request by telephone and fax. 
According to Plaintiff, Angie's List also operates as 
an "infonnation content provider" because it 
requests that individuals, as part of their report 
generation process, respond to standard queries and 
provide additional content about the professional 
against whom they are reporting. In applying the 
three-part test to the facts of the instant case, the 
Court finds that Defendant Angie's List is entitled 
to CDA immunity for the following reasons. 
1. Angie's Listi an lnteractive omputer Ser ice 
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As stated supra, the CDA defines an interactive 
computer service as "any information service, 
system, or access software that provides access to 
the internet and such systems operated or services 
offered by libraries or educational institutions." 4 7 
U.S.C. § 230(£)(2). The term "interactive computer 
service" 1*13] differs from "information content 
provider," which means "any person or entity that 
is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation 
or development of information provided through 
the Internet or any other interactive computer 
service." 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). " Defendant 
Angie's List argues that it qualifies as an 
"interactive computer service" and thus meets the 
first prong of the test. 
Plaintiff does not dispute that Angie's List offers an 
interactive exchange of information, but points out 
that members may be provided information on a 
service provider by phone or.fax, as well as via the 
internet. According to Plaintiff, because Angie's 
List offers infonnation by means other than online, 
it cannot claim the immunity protection of the CDA 
afforded to traditional interactive computer 
services. This argument is creative, but unsupported 
by the case law; Plaintiff did not provide, and the 
Court has been unable to locate, cases in which a 
website which offers users the option of receiving 
hard copies of online information via telephone or 
fax was deemed to be "not merely just an 
'interactive computer service."' See Rec. Doc. 12, p. 
5. The Court finds that excluding websites which 
1*14] offer this type of additional service from the 
protection of the CDA would be contrary to the 
policy behind the statute, which was "to promote 
the continued development of the internet" by 
allowing it to expand "unfettered by federal or state 
regulation." 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
2. Statements Were Made by a Third Party 
Plaintiff readily admits that the allegedly 
defamatory statements were made by a third party, 
Defendant Dr. Vereb. Plaintiffs complaint states 
that the subject comments were "posted by Dr. 
Vereb," and that "Dr. Vereb intentionally and 
maliciously posted false and defamatory comments 
concerning Plaintiff onto a national website to be 
viewed by all." Plaintiff Complaint, ~ii 10, 19. 
However, Plaintiff also argues that Angie's List 
operates as an information content provider. 
Plaintiff asserts that "through its services, Angie's 
List requests that individuals, as part of their report 
generation process, provide additional content 
about the professional against whom they are 
report," and that they are therefore responsible for 
the allegedly defamatory content of Dr. Vereb's 
postings. Plaintiff Opposition, p. 7. Therefore, 
although Plaintiff admits that Angie's List is not 
solely responsible [*15) for creating the content 
complained of, Plaintiff argues that Angie's List is 
responsible, in part, for the "development of the 
content provided." Id. 
However, Plaintiff fails to provide, and the Court 
has been unable to locate, binding case law 
establishing that a website's use of a questionnaire 
renders it a "content provider" of infonnation 
provided in response to same. The allegedly 
defamatory statements objected to by Plaintiff were 
admittedly authored by Defendant Dr. Vereb; the 
Court finds no authority for Plaintiffs argument 
that Defendant Angie's List can be held liable for 
these statements in spite of the protective 
provisions of the CDA. 
3. The Complaint Treats the Defendant as the 
Pub lisher of tJ1e Alleged Defamatory Statements 
For CDA immunity from state and federal claims, 
the defendant must be treated as the publisher of 
the alleged defamatory statements. Plaintiffs 
complaint specifically alleges that Angie's List is 
the "publisher...of infonnation to the general public 
searching for qualified medical services." Plaintiff 
Complaint ~ 28. Therefore, the third part of the test 
is satisfied. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Court finds that Defendant Angie's List meets 
the three requirements [*16] for asse1ting CDA 
immunity against the claims brought against it by 
CCIA App 5 
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Plaintiff. First, the defendant qualifies as an 
interactive service provider. Second, the defendant 
is not the source of the alleged defamatory 
statements. Third, the claim against the defendant 
treats the defendant as publisher of the alleged 
defamatory statements. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss 
(Rec. Doc. 8) filed by Defendant Angie's List, Inc. 
is hereby GRANTED. Plaintiff's claims against 
Angie's List are dismissed with prejudice. 
New Orleans, Louisiana, this 21st day of June, 
2012. 
Isl Jay C. Zainey 
JAY C. ZAINEY 
UNITED STATES DISTRJCT JUDGE 
End of Oocumcut 
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Counsel: [*1] For Kristanalea Dyroff, individually 
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Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Francisco, 
CA; John Joseph Moura, LEAD ATTORNEY, 
Gilbert Kelly Crowley & Jennett LLP, Los 
Angeles, CA. 
Judges: LAUREL BEELER, United States 
Magistrate Judge. 
Opinion by: LAUREL BEELER 
Opinion 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS 
Re: ECF No. 13 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff Kristanalea Dyroff, individually and 
on behalf of her son's estate, sued Ultimate 
Software after her son, 29-year-old Wesley Greer, 
died from an overdose of heroin laced with 
fentanyl. 1 Mr. Greer allegedly bought the drug from 
a drug dealer that he met online through their 
respective posts on Ultimate Software's (now 
inactive) social-network website "Experience 
Project." Ms. Dyroff asserts seven state claims: (1) 
Negligence, (2) Wrongful Death, (3) Premises 
Liability, (4) Failure to Warn, (5) Civil Conspiracy, 
(6) Unjust Enrichment, [*2] and (7) a violation of 
the Drug Dealer Liability Act (Cal. Health & Safety 
Code §§ 11700, et seq.). 2 She predicates Ultimate 
Software's liability on its mining data from its 
users' posts and using its proprietary algorithms to 
understand the posts and to make 
recommendations, which in this case steered Mr. 
Greer toward heroin-related discussion groups and 
the drug dealer who ultimately sold him the 
fentanyl-laced heroin. 3 Ultimate Software removed 
the action from state court based on diversity 
jurisdiction4 and moved to dismiss all claims under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).s 
For all claims except claim four, Ultimate Software 
asserts immunity under the Communications 
Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l).6 Section 
230(c)(l) provides immunity to website operators 
for third-party content on their website unless they 
1 Comp!.- ECF No. 1-1 at 5 (~ 8), 19 (ii 44). Record citations refer 
to material in the Electronic Case File ("ECF"); pinpoint citations are 
to the ECF-generated page numbers at the top of documents. 
2 Id. at 26-3 7 (~ii 72-126). 
3 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 15 at 12. 
4 Notice of Removal - ECF No. I at 1-3. 
5 Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 13-1. 
6 1d. at 8. 
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are responsible, in whole or in pmi, for the creation 
or development of content. Id. §§ 230(c)(l) & 
(f)(3). The court dismisses the claim because 
Ultimate Software is immune under§ 230(c)(l). Its 
"[ content]-neutral tools" facilitated communication 
but did not create or develop it. Fair Hous. Council 
of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 
521 F.3d 1157, 1167-69 (9th Cir. 2008) (en bane). 
For claim four (negligent failure to warn), Ultimate 
Software asserts that a website has no duty to warn 
its users of criminal activity by other users and that 
Mr. Greer assumed the risk of the obviously 
dangerous activity of [*3] buying drugs from an 
anonymous Internet drug dealer. 7 A duty to warn 
can arise from a business's "special relationship" 
with its customers or from its own creation of risk. 
McGarry v. Sax, 158 Cal. App. 4th 983, 995, 70 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 519 (2008). The court holds that 
Ultimate Software had no special relationship with 
Mr. Greer and did not create risk through its 
website functionalities or its interactions with law 
enforcement, and thus it had no duty to warn Mr. 
Greer about another user's criminal activity. 
The court dismisses all claims without prejudice 
and with leave to amend. 
* * * 
STATEMENT8 
Experience Project9 is a (now donnant) social-
anonymously share their first-person "experiences" 
with other users. 10 Experience Project's founder 
stated, "We don't want to know [a user's] real name, 
their phone number, what town they're from." "The 
impetus behind this policy [ of anonymity] was to 
encourage users to share experiences with the least 
amount of inhibition possible. The greater the 
anonymity, the more 'honest' the post . ... " 11 
Thus, Experience Project allowed users to register 
on the site with anonymous user names and 
thereafter join or start groups based on their 
experiences [*4] or interests, such as "I like dogs," 
"I have lung cancer," "I'm going to Stanford," or "I 
Love Heroin," and to post and discuss their 
personal experiences and interests to those 
groups. 12 After a user established an account and 
joined a group, the user could ask questions or 
answer questions posed by other members. 13 
Ultimate Software, using advanced data-mining 
algorithms, analyzed the posts and other user data 
to glean information, including the underlying 
intent and emotional state of the users. 14 Ultimate 
Software used this infonnation both for its own 
commercial purposes (such as selling data sets to 
third parties) and to steer Experience Project users 
to other groups on its website through its 
proprietary recommendation functionality. 15 It also 
utilized email and other "push" notifications to alert 
users when a new post or response occurred. 16 As 
of May 2016, the website had over sixty-seven 
million "experiences shared." 17 
network site consisting of vanous "online In 2007, when he was a college student, Mr. Greer 
communities" or "groups" where users 
7 Id al 18. 
~ The allegations in the "Statement" are from the plaintiffs 
complain!. See Comp!. - ECF No. 1-1. 
9 The plaintiff initially named Experience Project and Kanjoya, Inc. 
as additional defendants. Comp. - ECF No. 1-1. ln its notice of 
removal. Ultimate Sotiware explained that it acquired the website 
Experience Project from Kanjoya, which now is a wholly owned 
subsidiaiy of Ullimatc Software. Notice of Removal - ECF No. l ; 
Stipulation - ECF No. 18. The parties then stipulated to dismiss 
Experience Project and Kanjoya . Stipulation - ECF No. 18. 
Ultimate Software thus is the only defendant. 
1° Comp I. - ECF No. 1-1 at 6 (ii 12). 8 (ii 18). 
11 Id. at 16 (~ 36). 
12 Id. at 3 (~ 2), 8 (ii 18), 20 (ii 54). 
13 Id. at 9 (~ 2 1 ). 
14 Id. at 3 (~ 2). 
15 Id at 3 (ii 2) and 9 (ii 22). 
16 Id at 5 (~ 8), 20 (ii 52), 25-26 (ii 70). 
17 Id. at 9 (~ 20). 
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suffered a knee injury. During his recovery, he was 
prescribed opioid painkillers and became addicted, 
first to opioids and then to heroin. 18 He began 
treatment in 2011, completing five separate rehab 
programs, but he relapsed [*5] each time. 19 By 
2013, he had completed a faith-based program in 
Florida, remained clean, and continued living and 
working there.20 ln January 2015, the program was 
unable to hire him, and he left to run a halfway 
house . He was concerned that the drug-seeking 
environment there endangered his sobriety, and in 
February 2015, he moved home to Brunswick, 
Georgia, to live with his mother and stepfather and 
help them renovate their house.21 
ln August 2015, Mr. Greer conducted a Google 
search to find heroin, and he was directed to the 
defendant's website "Experience Project."22 He 
created an account with Experience Project, 
purchased "tokens" (which enabled him to post 
questions to other users), and posted to a group 
titled "where can i score heroin in jacksonville, 
fl ."23 
On August 17, 2015, Experience Project sent an 
email to Mr. Greer notifying him that "Someone 
posted a new update to the question 'where can i 
score heroin in jacksonville, fl,"' and providing a 
hyper link and a URL directing him to the update. 24 
This update ( or a similar one) alerted Mr. Greer that 
another Experience Project user, Hugo Margenat-
Castro, an Orlando-based drug dealer, had 
responded to Mr. Greer's post. Mr. Greer [*6] was 
able to obtain his phone number through 
Experience Project.25 Mr. Greer called Mr. 
IS id. at ] 9 (ii 44.) 
19 id. (ii 45). 
lO id. (~ 46). 
l I Jd. (il,J 4 7-48). 
22 id. at 20 (ii 49). 
2
.1 id at 20 (1il 49-5 I) . 
2
~ id. at 20 (~ 52). 
Margenat-Castro, and in the early hours of August 
18, 2015, drove from Brunswick, Georgia, to 
Orlando, Florida, where he bought fentanyl-laced 
heroin from Mr. Margenat-Castro. He then returned 
to Brunswick. 26 On August 19, 2015, Mr. Greer 
died from fentanyl toxicity. 27 
In numerous earlier posts on Experience Project, 
Mr. Margenat-Castro offered heroin for sale in 
groups such as "l love Heroin" and "heroin in 
Orlando." He actually sold heroin mixed with 
fentanyl ("a fact that he hid in his posts" and 
"misrepresented as heroin"). Fentanyl is a synthetic 
opioid that is fifty times stronger than heroin.28 
Before Mr. Greer's death, Mr. Margenat-Castro 
regularly used Experience Project to sell a mixture 
of heroin and fentanyl. Based on his activity on 
Experience Project, law-enforcement agencies 
conducted "controlled buys" of heroin from Mr. 
Margenat-Castro on March 31, 2015, and June 24, 
2015, and Mr. Margenat-Castro was arrested on 
April 1, 2015, and June 25, 2015, for possession 
with intent to sell fentanyl, among other drugs, 
stemming from his sale of drugs on Experience 
Project's website.29 Officers made another [*7] 
controlled buy from Mr. Margenat-Castro on 
September 3, 2015 . They tied him to his Experience 
Project handle "Potheadjuice," confirmed through a 
toxicology report that the substance contained 
fentanyl, and obtained an an-est warrant on October 
7, 2015.30 ln his March 2017 plea agreement, Mr. 
Margenat-Castro estimated that he sold ten bags of 
fentanyl-laced heroin every day (seven days a 
week) between January 2015 and October 2015 via 
Experience Project. He estimated selling roughly 
2S Jd. at 20-21 (iliJ 53-55). 
26 id. at 20-21 (ilil 54-55, 57). 
21 id. at 21 (1 57). 
lk id. at 5 (il,17-8). 20 (iJ 54), 22-23 (iJ 61 ). 
29 id. at 22-23 (~~ 61. 63). 
30 Id. at 24 (ii 67). 
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1,400 bags of heroin laced with fentanyl.3 1 Ms. 
Dyroff contends that by August 17, 2015, when her 
son bought the drugs from Mr. Margenat-Castro, 
Ultimate Software had actual or constructive 
knowledge of Mr. Margenat-Castro's trafficking 
fentanyl-laced heroin on Experience Project.32 
Ms. Dyroff alleges that Ultimate Software operated 
Experience Project in an unlawful manner that 
facilitated extensive drug trafficking between drug 
dealers and drug buyers, even providing "reviews" 
of drug dealers who trafficked on Experience 
Project's website. 33 Specifically, she alleges that 
Ultimate Software: 
( 1) allowed its Experience Project users to 
anonymously traffic in illegal deadly narcotics; 
(2) allowed users to create groups [*8] 
dedicated to the sale and use of such illegal 
narcotics; 
(3) steered users to "additional" groups 
dedicated to the sale of such narcotics (through 
the use of its advanced data-mining algorithms 
to manipulate and funnel vulnerable individual 
users to hannful drug trafficking groups on 
Experience Project's website); 
( 4) sent users emails and other push 
notifications of new posts in those groups 
related to the sale of deadly narcotics; 
(5) allowed Experience Project users to remain 
active account holders despite (a) the users' 
open drug trafficking on Experience Project's 
website, (b) Ultimate Software's knowledge of 
this (including knowledge acquired through its 
proprietary data-mining technology, which 
allowed it to analyze and understand its users' 
drug-trafficking posts) and ( c) multiple law-
enforcement actions against users related to 
their drug dealing on the Experience Project 
website; 
( 6) exhibited general and explicit antipathy 
)I Id. at 21-22 (~ 58), 23-24 <ii 64). 
33 lei. at I 3 (ii 3 I), 25-26 (ii 70), 26-27 (~ 73), 27 (ii 75). 
towards law enforcement's efforts to curb 
illegal activity on Experience Project's 
website;34 and 
(7) received numerous information requests, 
subpoenas, and warrants from law enforcement 
and should have known about drug trafficking 
on its site by its users, including [*9] - by the 
time of her son's death - Mr. Margenat-
Castro's sales of fentanyl-laced heroin. 35 
* * * 
GOVERNING LAW 
A complaint must contain a "short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief' to give the defendant "fair notice" 
of what the claims are and the grounds upon which 
they rest. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Bell At!. Corp. v. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 
L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A complaint does not need 
detailed factual allegations, but "a plaintiffs 
obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 
'entitlement to relief requires more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the 
elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual 
allegations must be enough to raise a claim for 
relief above the speculative level .... " Id. (internal 
citations omitted). 
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual allegations, which when 
accepted as true, "'state a claim to relief that is 
plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 193 7, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 
(2009) (quoting Twomb(v, 550 U.S. at 570). "A 
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged." Id. "The plausibility 
standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' 
but it asks for more than a sheer [*10] possibility 
)<lei.at 26-27 (~ 73). 3-4 c,1,12-3). 16-17 <ii 38). 
)S Id at 4 c,1 5). 17 c,1 39), 24 (~ 65), 25 c,1 70). 
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that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. ( quoting 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). "Where a complaint 
pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a 
defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line 
between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement 
to relief.""' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 
If a court dismisses a complaint, it generally should 
give leave to amend unless "the pleading could not 
possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts." 
Cook, Perkiss & Liehe, Inc. v. N. Cal. Collection 
Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990). A 
court need not grant leave to amend if the court 
detennines that permitting a plaintiff to amend 
would be futile. See e.g., Beckman v. Match.com, 
LLC, 668 Fed. Appx. 759, 759 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(district court did not abuse its discretion when it 
detem1ined that amendment of claims [barred by § 
230 of the Communications Decency Act] would 
be futile) (citing Saul v. United States, 928 F.2d 
829, 843 (9th Cir. 1991)); Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & 
J. Gallo Winery, 829 F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987). 
* * * 
ANALYSIS 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of the information." Id. §§ 230(c)(l) 
& (f)(3). The plaintiff contends that Ultimate 
Software developed third-party infonnation ( or 
content) here by mining data from its users' posts 
and using its proprietary algorithms to understand 
the posts and to make recommendations, which in 
this case steered Mr. Greer toward heroin-related 
discussions and the drng dealer who sold him 
fentanyl-laced heroin. 37 The court holds that 
Ultimate Software is immune under § 230(c)(l). 
Only third parties posted content, and without 
more, Ultimate Software's providing content-
neutral tools to facilitate communication does not 
create liability. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 
1157 at 1167-69. 
In the next sections, the court provides an overview 
of the CDA and applies the Act to Ms. Dyroff s 
claims. 
1.1 Overview Of the Communications Decency 
Act 
Under the CDA, (I) website operators generally 
have immunity from third-party content posted on 
their websites, but (2) they are not immune if they 
The next sections address (1) whether Ultimate create or develop information, in whole or in part. 
Software has § 230(c)(l) immunity for all claims 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) & (f)(3). 
except claim four, the failure-to-warn claim, and 
(2) whether Ultimate Software had a duty to warn 
Mr. Greer that Mr. Margenat-Castro was selling 
fentanyl-laced heroin. 
1. Section 230(c)(l) Immunity 
For all claims except claim four, Ultimate Software 
asserts that as a website operator, it is immune from 
liability under the Communications Decency Act 
("CDA"), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(l). 36 The CDA 
provides that website operators [*11] are immune 
from liability for third-party "information" (such as 
the posts here) unless the website operator "is 
JI, Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 13-1 at 8-15 . 
1.1.1 Immunity For Third-Party Content 
First, website operators [*12] generally are 
immune from liability from third-party posts. Id. 
Under the CDA, "[n]o provider or user of an 
interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided 
by another il?formation content provider." 47 
U.S.C. § 230(c)(l) (emphasis added). Moreover, 
"no [civil] liability may be imposed under any State 
or local law that is inconsistent" with § 230( c )(1 ). 
id. § 230(e)(3). 
Jl Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 15 at 12. 
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The most common "interactive computer services" 
are websites. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162 
n.6.38 The CDA defines an "information content 
provider" as "any person or entity that is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of infonnation provided through the 
Internet or any other interactive computer service." 
47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). 
In general, then, § 230( c )(1) "protects websites 
from liability for material posted on the[ir] 
website[s] by someone else." Doe v. internet 
Brands, inc., 824 F.3d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016). 
More specifically, § 230(c)(l) '"immunizes 
providers of interactive computer services against 
liability arising from content created by third 
parties."' Kimzey v. Yelp! inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1265 
(2016) (quoting Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 
1162). Section 230(c) thus "overrides the traditional 
treatment of publishers, distributors, and speakers 
under statutory and common law." Batzel v. Smith, 
333 F.3d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003). "The 
prototypical service qualifying for [CDA] 
immunity is an online messaging board ( or bulletin 
board) on which Internet subscribers post 
comments [*13] and respond to comments posted 
by others."' Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1266 (quoting FTC 
v. Accusearch inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 
2009)). 
1.1.2 No Immunity for Websites That Create or 
Develop Content 
But if a website operator "is responsible, in whole 
or in pai1, for the creation or development of 
information" on its website, then it is an 
"information content provider," and it does not 
have immunity from liability for that information. 
47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) & (f)(3); Roommates.com, 
.ix The definition "interactive computer service" is "any information 
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables 
computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including 
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet 
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or 
educational institutions." 47 U.S.C. § 230(t)(2). 
521 F.3d at 1165. As the Ninth Circuit has 
explained, the CDA "does not declare 'a general 
immunity from liability deriving from third-party 
content."' internet Brands, 824 F.3d at 852 (quoting 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th 
Cir. 2009)). Nor was it "meant to create a lawless 
no-man's land on the Internet." Roommates.com, 
521 F.3d at 1164. 
In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit considered 
whether Roommates.com created content, found 
that it did (at least "in part"), and concluded that it 
was not entitled to § 230( c )(1) immunity for the 
content that it created. 521 F.3d at 1165. 
Roommates.com operated a website that matched 
people renting rooms to people looking for a place 
to live. id. at 1161. It required subscribers to create 
profiles and answer questions - about themselves 
and preferences in roommates - regarding criteria 
including sex, sexual orientation, and whether they 
would bring children to the household. id. at 1161. 
The Fair Housing Councils of the San Fernando 
Valley and San [*14] Diego sued Roommates.com, 
alleging that it violated the federal Fair Housing 
Act and California housing-discrimination laws. id. 
at 1162. Roommates.com asserted that it had 
immunity under§ 230(c)(l). 
In its en bane decision, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Roommates.com was not immune for eliciting 
discriminatory preferences that violated federal and 
state fair-housing laws: 
By requiring subscribers to provide the 
information as a condition of accessing its 
service, and by providing a limited set of pre-
populated answers, Roommate39 [became J 
much more than a passive transmitter of 
infonnation provided by others; it [became] the 
developer, at least in part, of that infonnation. 
And section 230 provides immunity only if the 
interactive computer service does not 'creat[ e] 
or develop[]' the information 'in whole or in 
39 The op1111on refers to "Roommate" (as opposed to the plural 
Roommates, which is the spelling in the case caption and in the 
company's name Roommates.com). 
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part."' 
Id. at 1166 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3)). 
Accordingly, the court held, "the fact that [third-
pa1ty website] users are information content 
providers does not preclude [the website itself] 
from also being an information content provider by 
helping 'develop' at least 'in part' the information" 
at issue. Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165 
(emphasis in the original). This means that 
[a] website operator can be both a service 
provider and a content provider: If it passively 
displays [*15] content that is created entirely 
by third parties, then it is only a service 
provider with respect to that content. But as to 
content that it creates itself, or is 'responsible, 
in whole or in part' for creating or developing, 
the website is also a content provider." 
Id. at 1162 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3)). "Thus, 
a website may be immune from liability for some 
of the content it displays to the public but be 
subject to liability for other content." Id. at 1162-
63. As the court summed up, "[t]he CDA does not 
grant immunity for inducing third parties to express 
illegal preferences. Roommate's own acts -
posting the questionnaire and requiring answers to 
it - are entirely its doing and thus section 230 of 
the CDA does not apply to them. Roommate 1s 
entitled to no immunity." Id. at 1165. 
By contrast, the court immunized Roommates.com 
from liability for statements that subscribers 
independently displayed m an "Additional 
Comments" section of their profile. Id. at 1173-74. 
Roommates.com prompted subscribers to 
"personalize your profile by writing a paragraph or 
two describing yourself and what you are looking 
for in a roommate." Id. at 1173. "[S]ubscribers 
provide[d] a variety of provocative and often very 
revealing answers," such as their preferences for 
roommates' sex, sexual orientation, and religion. Id. 
Roommates.com [*16] published the statements as 
written, did not provide guidance about content, 
and did not "urge subscribers to input 
discriminatory preferences." Id. at 1173-74. The 
court held that Roommates.com was "not 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the 
development of this content, which comes entirely 
from subscribers and is passively displayed by 
Roommate." Id. at 1174. "Without reviewing every 
post, Roommate would have no way to distinguish 
unlawful discriminatory preferences from perfectly 
legitimate statements." Id. Moreover, there could be 
no "doubt that this infonnation was tendered to 
Roommate for publication online." Id. "This," the 
Ninth Circuit held, "is precisely the kind of 
situation for which section 230 was designed to 
provide i1mnunity." Id. 
As an illustration of the difference between 
publishing third-party content (entitling the website 
operator to immunity) and developing content 
(resulting in no immunity), the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished Roommates.corn's search function 
from genenc search engines. Id. at 1167. 
Roommates.com steered users based on 
discriminatory criteria, thereby limiting search 
results and forcing users to participate in its 
discriminatory process. Id. By contrast, generic 
search engines such as Google, [*17] Yahoo!, and 
MSN "do not use unlawful criteria to limit the 
scope of the searches[,]. .. [are not] designed to 
achieve illegal ends [ unlike Roommates.corn's 
alleged search function, and thus] ... play no part 
in the 'development' of any unlawful searches." Id. 
at 1167. The court concluded that "providing 
neutral tools to carry out what may be unlawful or 
illicit [activities] does not amount to 'development' 
for purposes of the immunity exception." Id. at 
1168-69. 
1.1.3 Three-Element Test for Immunity Under§ 
230(c)(l) 
Separated into its elements, § 230( c )(]) protects 
from liability "'(1) a provider or user of an 
interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff 
seeks to treat, under a state law cause of action, as a 
publisher or speaker (3) of infonnation provided by 
another information content provider [here, Mr. 
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Margenat-Castro]."' Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268 
(quoting Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100-0 I). 
1.2 Application Of the Three-Element Test To 
Ms. Dyrofrs Claims 
1.2.1 ls Ultimate Software a Provider of an 
Interactive Computer Service? 
The first element is whether Experience Project is 
an "interactive computer service." It is undisputed 
that it is.40 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162 
(websites are the most common "interactive 
computer services"). 
1.2.2 Does the Plaintiff Seek To Treat Ultimate 
Software as a [*18] Publisher? 
The second element is whether Ms. Dyroff seeks to 
treat Ultimate Software as a speaker or publisher. 
Her claims predicate Ultimate Software's liability 
on its tools and functionalities. More specifically, 
she alleges that Ultimate Software creates or 
develops information by mining data from its users' 
posts, using its proprietary algorithms to analyze 
posts and recommend other user groups, and - in 
this case - steering Mr. Greer to heroin-related 
discussion groups and (through its emails and push 
notifications) to the drug dealer who sold him the 
fentanyl-laced heroin.41 
The issue here is whether plaintiffs can plead 
around§ 230(c)(l) immunity by basing their claims 
on the website's tools, rather than the website 
operator's role as a publisher of the third-party 
content. The Ninth Circuit has held that what 
matters is whether the claims "inherently require[] 
the court to treat the defendant as the 'publisher or 
speaker' of content provided by another." Barnes, 
570 F .3d at 1102. If they do, then § 230( c )(I) 
precludes liability. Id; accord A irbnb, Inc. v. City 
40 See, e.g., Comp!. - ECF No. 1-1 at 8 (ii 18). 
41 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss- ECF No. 15 at 12. 
& County of San Francisco, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 
1074 (2016) (citing Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1102). 
In similar cases, courts have rejected plaintiffs' 
attempts to plead around immunity by basing 
liability on a website's tools. [*19] See, e.g., 
Gonzalez v. Google, Inc., No. 16-cv-03282-DMR, 
282 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
175327, 2017 WL 4773366, at *10-11 (N.D. Cal. 
October 23, 2017) (rejecting the plaintiffs' 
argument that claims were not based Google's 
publishing third-party content from ISIS but instead 
were based on Google's "provid[ing] ISIS followers 
with access to powerful tools and equipment to 
publish their own content"); Fields v. Twitter, 217 
F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1121-22 (N.D. Cal. 2016), 
appeal docketed, No. 16-17165 (9th Cir. Nov. 25, 
2016) (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that their 
claims were not based on Twitter's publishing third-
party content by ISIS but instead were based on 
Twitter's allowing ISIS members to sign up for 
Twitter accounts). 
The court holds that Ms. Dyroff's claims at their 
core seek liability for publishing third-party 
content. Element two of the § 230( c )(I) test is 
satisfied. 
1.2.3 ls the Harmful Content "Third-Party 
Content"? 
The third element is whether the content is third-
party content. A third party - Mr. Margenat-
Castro - posted on Experience Project. The issue 
is whether his posts and other allegedly harmful 
content are third-party content, which means that § 
230( c )(1) bars the claims against Ultimate 
Software, or whether Ultimate Software "is 
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of the infomrntion," which means that 
§ 230(c)(l) does not bar the claims. 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(l) & (f)(3). 
Ms. Dyroff contends that the court should [*20] 
deem Ultimate Software to have "developed" the 
harmful content, at least in paii, for two reasons: 
CCIA App. 14 
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(1) its tools, design, and functionality abetted the 
content, at least in part, by recommending heroin-
related discussions and steering Mr. Greer to Mr. 
Margenat-Castro's posts; and (2) Ultimate Software 
is not merely a passive conduit for its users' posts 
because it knew that Experience Project was an 
online market for dmg dealers and users, and it 
shielded the bad actors through its anonymity 
policies and antipathy to law enforcement.42 
1.2.3.1 Ultimate Software's Use of Tools to 
Develop Content 
Ms. Dyroff contends that a website does not need to 
co-author a user's posts to "develop" the content 
and thus be responsible for the posts.43 See 47 
U.S.C. § 230(£)(3). She asserts that a website 
"develops" content otherwise created by third-party 
users (and loses immunity) when it "materially 
manipulates that content, including by passively 
directing its creation or by improperly using the 
content, after the fact. "44 "This manipulation can 
take myriad forms, including guiding the content's 
generation, either through posting guidelines that 
signal or direct the poster, content requirements for 
posts, or even post-hoc [*21] use of content that 
was generated in whole or in party by a third 
party."45 
Her specific allegations about Ultimate Software's 
development of information are as follows. 
Ultimate Software used "data mining" techniques 
and "machine learning" algorithms and tools to 
collect, analyze, and "learn[ ] the meaning and 
intent behind posts" in order to "recommend" and 
"steer" vulnerable users, like her son, to forums 
frequented by drug users and dealers. 46 By 
42 id. at 13-23. 
43 id. at 17. 
44 id. at 13 (citing Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168). 
4s id. (citations omitted). 
identifying interested users and usmg its 
"recommendation functionality" to steer them to 
drug-related "groups" or "online communities," 
Ultimate Software kept the users "engaged on the 
site" for Ultimate Software's financial gain (through 
online ad revenues, gathering more valuable user 
data, and other means).47 This system - combined 
with Experience Project's anonymous registration 
and its email-notification functionality that alerted 
users when groups received a new post or reply -
"created an environment where vulnerable addicts 
were subjected to a feedback loop of continual 
entreaties to connect with drug dealers. "48 
The ordinary rule is that Ultimate Software is 
immune from liability for third-party content on its 
website unless it is [*22] "responsible, in whole or 
in part, for the creation or development of 
information." 47 U.S.C. §§ 230(c)(l) & (f)(3). 
Here, only third parties posted information on 
Experience Project, and the website operator did 
not solicit unlawful infonnation or otherwise create 
or develop content. Ultimate Software is not an 
"infonnation content provider" merely because its 
content-neutral tools (such as its algorithms and 
push notifications) steer users to unlawful content. 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167. The following 
points support this conclusion. 
First, making recommendations to website users 
and alerting them to posts are ordinary, neutral 
functions of social-network websites. To support 
her contrary contention that Ultimate Software's 
functionalities create or develop information, Ms. 
Dyroff relies on Roommates.com and Anthony v. 
Yahoo! Inc., but she does not allege any facts 
comparable to the facts in those cases.49 
28)), 18-19 ( citing Comp I. - ECF No. 1-1 at 5 <ii~ 7-8). 11-19 <iii! 
26-42), 20 ci1~ 52-53 l, 25-26 ci1i1 10-11 n. 
47 id. at 7, 17-19; Comp!. - ECF No. 1-1 at 3 (ii 2), 4-5 (ii~ 6-8), 9-
12 c~i1 22-23, 25, 21-29), 18-19 ci1 42), 22 <ii 59), 25-26 c~i1 10-11 l, 
21 c~ 75), 30 c~ 9o), 32 cil 96), 34 <i1101), 35 ci1114). 36 <i1116). 
48 id. at l O ( citing Comp I. - ECF No. 1-1 at 11-16 (iii! 26-35). 
49 id. at 13-16 (citing Roommates.com. 521 F.3d at 1161-62. 1165. 
46idat 7, 9-10 (citing Comp!.- ECF No. 1-1 at 9-12 <i!il 22-23, 27- 1167-68, andA11tho11y ,,. Yahoo! inc .. 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262-63 
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In Roommates.com, the website operator created a 
questionnaire, provided a limited set of pre-
populated (and unlawful) answers as a condition of 
accessing the website and its services, and steered 
users based on the pre-populated answers. 521 F .3d 
at 1166-67. By these acts, Roommates.com 
"[became] much more than a passive transmitter of 
infonnation provided 1*23) by others; it [became] 
the developer, at least in part, of that information. 
And section 230 provides immunity only if the 
interactive computer service does not 'creat[ e] or 
develop[]' the information 'in whole or in part."' Id. 
at 1166 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3)). By 
contrast, here, Ultimate Software did not solicit 
unlawful content from its third-party users and 
merely provided content-neutral social-network 
functionalities recommendations and 
notifications about posts. "Providing neutral tools 
for navigating websites is fully protected by CDA 
immunity, absent substantial affirmative conduct on 
the part of the website creator promoting the use of 
such tools for unlawful purposes." Id. at 1174 n.37; 
accord Gonzalez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175327, 
2017 WL 4773366, at *11 (rejecting claim that 
Google was liable because Y ouTube's website 
"functionality" purpmiedly facilitated ISIS's 
communication of its message, which resulted in 
great harm); Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 
3d 140, 158 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2017) (rejecting 
claim that Facebook provided a tool to support 
terrorist organizations); Fields, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 
1120-23 (rejecting claim that Twitter provided ISIS 
with material support by permitting it to sign up for 
accounts). Ms. Dyroff does not plausibly allege that 
Ultimate Software "promoted the use of [its 
neutral] tools for unlawful purposes." 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37. 
Similarly, Ms. Dyroff relies on Anthony v. 
Yahoo /*24/ ! , but does not allege facts comparable 
to those in that case. Yahoo! allegedly created fake 
user profiles and sent them - along with actual 
user profiles of former subscribers - to current 
website users to try to persuade them to renew their 
(N.D. Cnl. 2006)). 
lapsed subscriptions to Yahoo's online dating 
service. 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. Assuming the 
allegations to be true for its Rule 12(b)(6) inquiry, 
the court held that Yahoo! was not immune under § 
230(c)(l) for two reasons. Id. First, Yahoo! created 
content in the form of the false profiles and thus 
was an "infonnation content provider." Id. at 1262-
63. Second, with actual knowledge of the false 
profiles - including those of former users -
Yahoo! used the content to (allegedly) commit 
fraud and thus was responsible for its 
misrepresentations. Id. ( collecting cases on § 
230(c)(l) immunity). By contrast, here, Ultimate 
Software did not create or use unlawful content and 
merely provided its neutral social-network 
functionalities. 
Second, it is the users' voluntary inputs that create 
the content on Experience Project, not Ultimate 
Software's proprietary algorithms. See, e.g., 
Kimzey, 836 F.3d at 1268-70 (Yelp!'s "star-rating 
system is best characterized as the kind of 'neutral 
tool[]' operating on 'voluntary inputs' that we 
determined that does not f *25) amount to content 
development or creation in Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d at 1172."). Moreover, even if a tool 
"'facilitates the expression of [harmful or unlawful] 
infonnation,"' it is considered neutral "so long as 
users ultimately determine what content to post, 
such that the tool merely provides 'a framework 
that could be utilized for proper or improper 
purposes."' Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 
2d 1193, 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting claim 
that Google's "Keyword Tool" - which provides 
options that advertisers can adopt or reject at their 
discretion - created liability for subsequent 
postings by the adve1iisers of false or misleading 
advertisements) ( citing Roommates.com, 521 F .3d 
at 1172); Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121, 1124; see 
also Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358, 
410 U.S. App. D.C. 187 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("a 
website does not create or develop content when it 
merely provides a neutral means by which third 
parties can post information of their own 
independent choosing online"). 
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Third, the result holds even when a website collects 
information about users and classifies user 
characteristics. The website is immune, and not an 
"information content provider," as Jong as users 
generate all content. Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1121, 
1124 ( online dating site used questionnaires to 
collect information about members; "the fact that 
[the site] classifies user characteristics into discrete 
categories and collects responses to specific essay 
questions does [*26] not transform the [site] into a 
'developer' of the 'underlying misinformation."'). 
The court follows these cases and holds that the 
Experience Project website's alleged functionalities 
- including its user anonymity, algorithmic 
recommendations of related groups, and the "push" 
e-mail notification of posts and responses - are 
content-neutral tools. Roommates.Com, 521 F.3d at 
1168-69. They do not make Ultimate Software an 
"infonnation content provider" that "is responsible, 
in whole or in pai1, for the creation or development 
of information provided through the Internet or any 
other interactive computer service," even if the 
tools were used to facilitate unlawful activities on 
the site. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3); 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37; Carafano, 
339 F.3d at 1123. In sum, Ultimate Software is 
immune under § 230( c )(I) as a publisher of content 
created entirely by third-party users. 
1.2.3.2 Online Market For Drug Trafficking and 
Shielding Bad Actors 
Ms. Dyroff contends Ultimate Software knew or 
should have known that users sold drugs on 
Experience Project, and it shielded bad actors from 
the consequences of the drug dealing through its 
anonymity policies and antipathy to law-
enforcement requests. 50 The idea is that Ultimate 
Software is less Match.com and more Silk Road (a 
notorious online platform for [*27] criminal 
activities, including selling illegal drugs). As 
evidence of Ultimate Software's intent to shield bad 
50 Id at 18: see also Comp!. ~- ECF No. 1-1 at 17-19 (ii~ 39-42). 
actors from law-enforcement efforts, the complaint 
cites Ultimate Software's March 2016 public 
statement discussing its reasons for suspending the 
Experience Project website. 
From day one, the privacy of our users has 
been paramount and we have never allowed 
names, phone numbers, or addresses. This 
approach bucked every trend, and challenged 
our ability to build an advertising-based 
business, but we passionately believe it 
provided the foundation for some of the most 
meaningful relationships imaginable . . . But 
there is no denying that the way people expect 
to use social media today is markedly different 
... and as the primary use has moved from web 
to mobile, our hallmark attributes like long-
form stories are not aligned. 
But, there are deeper, and more troubling 
trends than formats. Online anonymity, a core 
part of EP, is being challenged like never 
before. Governments and their agencies are 
aggressively attacking the foundations of 
internet privacy with a deluge of information 
requests, subpoenas, and warrants. We, of 
course, always support proper law enforcement 
efforts, [*28] but the well-documented 
potential for even abuse, even if unintentional, 
is enormous and growing. 51 
The complaint's allegations do not establish a 
theory of liability. The statement manifests a 
concern with Internet privacy that has been 
widespread in the technology sector and does not 
establish antipathy to law enforcement, especially 
given the statement about suppo11ing "proper law 
enforcement requests." 
Moreover, as the analysis in the last section 
establishes, Ultimate Software's functionalities are 
neutral tools that do not transform Ultimate 
Software into an "information content provider," 
even if the tools were used to facilitate unlawful 
activities on the site. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); 
51 Comp!.- ECF No. I-I at 17-18 (ii 41) (emphasis omitted). 
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Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37; Barnes, 
570 F.3d at 1103; Gonzalez, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
175327, 2017 WL 4 773366, at * 10. Ultimate 
Software's policy about anonymity may have 
allowed illegal conduct, and the neutral tools 
facilitated user communications, but these website 
functionalities do not "create" or "develop" 
information, even in part. 47 U.S.C. § 230(£)(3); 
Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174 n.37; Carafano, 
339 F.3d at 1123. And they do not show that 
Ultimate Software engaged in "substantial 
affirmative conduct ... promoting the use of [the] 
tools for unlawful purposes." Roommates.com, 521 
F.3d at 1167-68, 1174 n.37. Liability requires more 
than "neutral tools." Id 
As the Ninth Circuit concluded in Roommates.com: 
II 
Websites are complicated enterprises, [*29] 
and there will always be close cases where a 
clever lawyer could argue that something the 
website operator did encouraged the illegality. 
Such close cases, we believe, must be resolved 
in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out 
of section 230 by forcing websites to ... fight[] 
off claims that they promoted or encouraged -
or at least tacitly assented to - the illegality of 
third parties. Where it is very clear that the 
website directly participates in developing the 
alleged illegality ... [,] immunity will be lost. 
But in cases of enhancement by implication or 
development by inference... [,] section 230 
must be interpreted to protect websites not 
merely from ultimate liability, but from having 
to fight costly and protracted legal battles. 
521 F.3dat 1174-75 . 
Because Ultimate Software IS Immune under § 
230( c )(I), the court dismisses all claims except 
claim four. 
2. Count Four: Failure to Warn 
In claim four, Ms. Dyroff contends that Ultimate 
Software had a duty to warn Mr. Greer that Mr. 
Margenat-Castro was selling fentanyl-laced heroin 
via the Experience Project website. 52 Ultimate 
Software moves to dismiss the claim on the 
grounds that (I) it had no "special relationship" 
with Mr. Greer or created any risks that gave rise to 
a duty [*30] to warn him, and (2) Mr. Greer 
assumed the risk of buying drugs from an 
anonymous Internet drug dealer. 53 The CDA does 
not preclude a failure-to-warn claim. Internet 
Brands, 824 F.3d at 849-54. 
The next sections address (I) whether Ultimate 
Software had a "special relationship" with Mr. 
Greer that gave rise to a duty to warn, (2) whether 
Ultimate Software created a risk that gave rise to a 
duty to warn, and (3) whether the assumption-of-
risk doctrine bars recovery. 
2.1 Duty to Warn: Special Relationship -
Nonfeasance (Failure to Act) 
The first issue is whether Ultimate Software had a 
duty to warn Mr. Greer that Mr. Margenat-Castro 
was selling fentanyl-laced heroin because - like 
any brick-and-mortar business - it had a "special 
relationship" with him that created that duty. 
The California Supreme Court has not addressed 
whether a website has a special relationship with its 
users that gives rise to a duty to warn them of 
dangers. The court's task thus is to "predict how the 
state high comi would resolve" the issue. Giles v. 
GMAC, 494 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2007) 
(quotation omitted). For guidance, the court looks 
to decisions in the state's intermediate appellate 
courts and other jurisdictions. Id 
The elements of a negligence claim are ( 1) the 
existence of a duty to [*31] exercise due care, (2) 
breach of that duty, (3) causation, and ( 4) damages. 
Merrill v. Navegar, Inc., 26 Cal. 4th 465, 110 Cal. 
52 Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 13-1 at 18-21; Reply - ECF No. 
16 at 18-20. 
5.1 Jd. 
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Rptr. 2d 370, 28 P.3d I 16, 139 (Cal. 2001). A duty 
to exercise due care is an "obligation to conform to 
a certain standard of conduct for the protection of 
others against unreasonable risks." Mc Garry v. Sax, 
158 Cal. App. 4th 983, 994, 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 519 
(2008) (quotation omitted) . 
"'The existence of a legal duty to use reasonable 
care in a particular factual situation is a question of 
Jaw for the court to decide."' McGarry, 158 Cal. 
App. 4th at 994 (quoting Adams v. City ofFremont, 
68 Cal. App. 4th 243, 265, 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 196 
(1998)); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 
3d 741, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728, 732 (Cal. 
1980); Vasquez, 118 Cal. App. 4th 269, 279, 12 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (2004) (Imposing a duty is "'an 
expression of policy considerations leading to the 
legal conclusion that a plaintiff is entitled to a 
defendant's protection."') (quoting Ludwig v. City of 
San Diego, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1105, 1110, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 809 (1998)); accord Tarasojfv. Regents of 
Univ. of Cal(fornia, 17 Cal. 3d 425, 131 Cal. Rptr. 
14, 551 P.2d 334,342 (Cal. 1976) ("legal duties are 
not discoverable facts of nature, but merely 
conclusory expressions that, in cases of a particular 
type, liability should be imposed for damage 
done") . 
Under California law, if a person has not created a 
danger, then generally he has no duty to come to 
the aid of another person (a victim) absent a 
relationship that gives rise to a duty to protect. 
Zelig v. County of Los Angeles, 27 Cal. 4th 1112, 
119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171 , 1182 (Cal. 
2002); accord McGarry, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 995 . 
The "special relationship" can be between the 
person and a third party that imposes a duty to 
control the third party's conduct. Zelig, 45 P.3d at 
I I 83. Or it can be a special relationship between 
the person and the foreseeable victim of the third 
party's conduct that requires [*32) the person to 
protect the victim. Id.; accord Taraso_ff; 551 P.2d at 
342. 
The "special relationship" giving rise to a duty to 
protect derives "from the common law's distinction 
between misfeasance and nonfeasance, and its 
reluctance to impose liability for the latter." Zelig, 
45 P.3d at 1183 ( quotation omitted). Nonfeasance 
is a failure to act. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 
Cal. 3d 40, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468, 539 P.2d 36, 41 
(Cal. 1975). "Misfeasance exists when the 
defendant is responsible for making the plaintiff's 
position worse, i.e., defendant has created a risk." 
Id. With misfeasance, the question of duty is 
governed by the ordinary-care standard for 
negligence. Lugtu v. Cal(fornia Highway Patrol, 26 
Cal. 4th 703, 716, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d 528, 28 P.3d 
249 (2001). 
In sum, a "special relationship" can create a duty to 
act even when one otherwise would not have such a 
duty . Zelig, 45 P .3d at 1183 . Ultimate Software 
thus can be responsible for its nonfeasance (its 
failure to act) if ( 1) it had a special relationship 
with a third-party actor and thus had a duty to 
control that actor, or (2) it had a special relationship 
with Mr. Greer and thus owed him a duty to protect 
him. Id. The plaintiff argues that like any business, 
Ultimate Software has a "special relationship" with 
its customers that creates a duty to warn them of 
known risks. 54 
Courts commonly involve the special-relationship 
doctrine "'in cases involving the relationship 
between business [*33) proprietors such as 
[landlords,] shopping centers, restaurants, and bars, 
and their tenants, patrons, or invitees.'" McGany, 
158 Cal. App. 4th at 995 (quoting Delgado v. Trax 
Bar & Grill, 36 Cal. 4th 224, 30 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145, 
113 P.3d 1159, 1165 (Cal. 2005)). "A business 
owner may have an affirmative duty to 'control the 
wrongful acts of third persons which threaten 
invitees where the [business owner] has reasonable 
cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of 
injury resulting therefrom ."' Id. (citing Taylor v. 
Cenlennial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 114, 52 Cal. Rptr. 
561, 416 P.2d 793 (1966)) . "The doctrine also 
extends to other types of special relationship[s] ... 
including those between common carriers and 
5~ Motion to Dismiss --- ECF No. I 5 at 26. 
CCIAApp. 19 
Page 14 of 17 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194524. *33 
passengers, and mental health professionals and 
their patients." id. ( quoting Tarasoff; 551 P .2d at 
334). These "special relationships generally involve 
some kind of dependency or reliance." Olson v. 
Children's Home Soc'y, 204 Cal. App. 3d 1362, 
1366, 252 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1988); see e.g., Williams v. 
State of Cal{fornia, 34 Cal. 3d 18, 192 Cal. Rptr. 
233, 664 P.2d 137, 139 (Cal. 1983) (a factor 
supporting a special relationship is detrimental 
reliance by a person on another person's conduct 
that induced a false sense of security and worsened 
the position of the person relying on the conduct). 
"'[T]he use of special relationships to create duties 
has been largely eclipsed by the more modem use 
of balancing policy factors enumerated in Rowland 
[v. Christian.]"' McGarry, 158 Cal. App. 4th at 996 
(quoting Doe I v. City of Murrieta, 102 Cal. App. 
4th 899, 918, 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213 (2002)) (citing 
Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
97, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (Cal. 1968)). The Rowland 
factors are the following: "[(1)] the foreseeability of 
harm to the plaintiff, [(2)] the degree of certainty 
that the plaintiff [*34] suffered injury, [(3)] the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant's 
conduct and the injury suffered, [(4)] the moral 
blame attached to the defendant's conduct, [(5)] the 
policy of preventing future harm, [(6)] the extent of 
the burden to the defendant and consequences to 
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care 
with resulting liability for breach, and [(7)] the 
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for 
the risk involved." id. at 996-97 (quoting Rowland, 
443 P.2d at 564); see also Hansra v. Superior 
Court,7 Cal App. 4th 630, 646, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 216 
(1992) ("whether a special relationship exists 
giving rise to a duty to protect ... [involves] 
consideration of the same factors underlying any 
duty of care analysis"). 
Following remand of the internet Brands case, the 
district court addressed whether a website has a 
"special relationship" with its users that required 
the website to warn users of known risks on the 
website. See Jane Doe No. 14 v. Internet Brands, 
inc., No. 2:12-CV-3626-JFW (PJW), 2016 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 192144, ECF No. 51 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 
14, 2016). The court found no special relationship 
and thus no duty to warn. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
192144 at *11. 
The plaintiff was an aspiring model who was a 
member of the networking website 
modelmayhem.com. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
192144 at *5. Two men - who were unaffiliated 
with the website - used the website to 
identify [*35] and lure victims (including the 
plaintiff) to Florida, where they drugged and raped 
the victims, filming the rapes for distribution as 
pornography videos. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
192144 at *3. The plaintiff claimed that by the time 
she was raped in 2011, Internet Brands knew about 
the two men, had a duty to warn its users, and thus 
was liable for its negligent failure to warn her. 2016 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144 at *4. 
The case involved nonfeasance, not misfeasance. 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144 at *8 (rejecting as 
unsubstantiated the claim that Internet Brands 
created the risk). The court found no "special 
relationship" between Internet Brands and the two 
men who carried out the rape scheme, and it thus 
found that Internet Brands had no duty to control 
their conduct. id. It then addressed whether Internet 
Brands had a "special relationship" with the victim-
plaintiff, who was a member of the website "along 
with at least 600,000 others." Id. The court applied 
the Rowland factors and concluded that there was 
no special relationship between the website and its 
users and thus no duty to warn. 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 192144 at *5. 
Another district court - again on remand from the 
Ninth Circuit - also concluded that a website had 
no duty to warn its users. Beckman v. Match.com, 
LLC, No. 2:13-CV-97 JCM (NJK), 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 35562, 2017 WL 1304288, at *4 (D. Nev. 
Mar. I 0, 2017). The plaintiff met and dated a 
man 1*36] on Match.com and ended their 
relationship eight days later. 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 35562, [WL] at * 1. He then sent her 
threatening messages for about four days, and four 
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months later, attacked her viciously. Id She sued 
Match.com for failure to warn her that the website 
and her attacker were dangerous, basing her claim 
in part on Match.corn's access to data about its 
users and use of the data to create matches. 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35562, [WL] at *1-*3. Applying 
Nevada law, which is similar to California law, the 
court found no special relationship between 
Match.com and the plaintiff. 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 35562, [WL] at *3-*4. The plaintiff was 
merely a paying subscriber, paid the fee, set up her 
profile, and was matched with the attacker. 2017 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35562, [WL] at *3. The court 
concluded that the website had no special 
relationship with the plaintiff and thus no duty to 
warn her. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35562, [WL] at 
*4. 
These cases support the conclusion that a website 
has no "special relationship" with its users. Ms. 
Dyroff nonetheless contends that websites 
operators such as Ultimate Software are the 
"twenty-first century equivalent of a brick and 
mortar business. . . like restaurants, bars, . . . 
amusement parks, and all businesses open to the 
public" and have the same duty that all businesses 
open to the public owe their invitees. The duty 
"includ[es] 'tak[ing] affinnative action (*37] to 
control the wrongful acts of third persons which 
threaten invitees where the occupant has reasonable 
cause to anticipate such acts and the probability of 
injury resulting therefrom. "55 
If the court followed this approach, it would render 
all social-network websites potentially liable 
whenever they connect their members by 
algorithm, merely because the member is a 
member. This makes no sense practically. Imposing 
a duty at best would result in a weak and ineffective 
general warning to all users. Internet Brands, No. 
2:12-cv-3626-JFW (PJW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
192144, ECF No. 51 at 6. It also "likely [ wou Id] 
have a 'chilling effect' on the [l]nternet by opening 
the floodgates of litigation." 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
192144 at * 14 (referencing the briefs in the Ninth 
Circuit). Also, the court is not convinced that a 
bricks-and-mortar business (such as a bar where 
people meet more obviously) is a good analogue to 
a social-network website that fosters connections 
online. For one, allocating risk is (in part) about 
foreseeability of harm and the burdens of allocating 
risk to the defendant or the plaintiff. See Rowland, 
443 P.2d at 561. Risk can be more apparent in the 
real world than in the virtual social-network 
world. 56 That seems relevant here, when the claim 
is that a social-network f *38] website ought to 
perceive risks - through its automatic algorithms 
and other inputs -about a drug dealer on its site. 
Moreover, even if Ultimate Software had superior 
knowledge about Mr. Margenat-Castro's selling 
fentanyl-laced heroin, that knowledge does not 
create a special relationship absent dependency or 
detrimental reliance by its users, including Mr. 
Greer. Internet Brands, No. 2: 12-cv-3626-JFW 
(PJW), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144, ECF No. 
51 at 6 ("it may have been foreseeable that [the two 
men] would strike again"). For example, in Conti v. 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, 
Inc., the California Court of Appeal held that a 
religious organization had no special relationship 
with its congregation and thus had no duty to warn 
them - despite its knowledge of the high risk of 
56 Ms. Dyroff cites eBay, inc v. Bidder's Edge, Inc. to support the 
conclusion that a business's liability does not turn on the difference 
between a bricks-and-mortar business and an Internet business. 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 15 at 24-25 (citing I 00 
F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1065 (N.D. Cal. 2000)). eBay docs not change the 
court's conclusion. In eBay. the court granted eBay a preliminary 
injunction to prevent a competing auction website from scanning 
eBay's website for nuction info1111ation. 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1065. The 
cou11 held that the difference between eBay's vi1iual store and a 
physical store were "formalistic." and it found the competitor's 
actions more like a trespass to real property (as opposed to a trespass 
to chattels) because the electronic signals were sufficiently tangible 
to equate to a physical presence on eBay's property. Id. at 1067 & 
11.16. That result makes sense: there was a threatened physical 
55 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss - ECF No. 15 at 24-26 (quoting incursion onto cBay's website. But it provides no support for 
Taylor v, Ce111e1111ial Bowl, Inc., 65 Cal. 2d 114. 52 Cal. Rptr. 561. equating bricks-and-mortar businesses (such as bars) to social-
416 P.2d 793, 797 (Cal. 1996)). network websites. 
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recidivism - that a fellow member was a child 
molester. Id. ( citing Conti, 235 Cal. App. 4th 1214, 
186 Cal. Rptr. 3 d 26 (2015), as the case with the 
most analogous facts). ln Olson, the California 
Court of Appeal held that there was no ongoing 
"special relationship" between an adoption agency 
and a birth mother who gave up her son for 
adoption that required the agency to notify the birth 
mother when it learned that the son tested positive 
for a [*39) serious inherited disease passed from 
mothers to their male offspring. Olson, 204 Cal. 
App. 3d at 1366-67. The birth mother later had a 
second son with the same affliction. Id. By contrast, 
a duty can arise for a defendant with superior 
knowledge if there is dependency or reliance. See 
Internet Brands, No. 2: 12-cv-3626-JFW (PJW), 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 192144, ECF No. 51 at 6 
n.3 (citing O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees Cmp., 
75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977)). In 
O'Hara, the landlord had a duty to warn his tenant, 
who was raped, about the risks because he knew of 
prior rapes at the apartment complex, knew about 
the likelihood of a repeat attack because police 
gave him composite drawings of the suspect and a 
description of his modus operandi, failed to warn 
his tenant, and assured her that the premises were 
safe and patrolled at all times by professional 
guards). Id. (citing O'Hara, 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 
142 Cal. Rptr. 487). Here, Ms. Dyroff has not 
alleged dependency or reliance. 
ln sum, the court holds that there was no special 
relationship between Ultimate Software and Mr. 
Greer that gave rise to a duty to warn. 
2.2 Duty to Warn - Misfeasance (Creation of 
Risk) 
Ms. Dyroff also contends that Ultimate Software 
created a risk of hann through its website 
functionalities and thus owed her son an ordinary 
duty of care to warn him about Mr. Margenat-
Castro's trafficking [*40] of fentanyl-laced 
heroin.57 The court holds that Ultimate Software's 
use of the neutral tools and functionalities on its 
website did not create a risk of harm that imposes 
an ordinary duty of care. See Lugtu, 28 P.3d at 256-
57 (negligence standard for misfeasance). A 
contrary holding would impose liability on a social-
network website for using the ordinary tools of 
recommendations and alerts. The result does not 
change merely because Experience Project 
pennitted anonymous users. 
2.3 Assumption of Risk 
The last issue is whether the assumption-of-risk 
doctrine bars Mr. Greer's failure-to-warn claim. 
Because the com1 holds that there is no duty to 
warn, it does not reach the issue. If it were to reach 
the issue, it would likely hold that the doctrine 
operates as a complete bar to his claim because Mr. 
Greer - who initiated the contact with Mr. 
Margenat-Castro by his posts on Experience Project 
and then bought drugs from him - assumed the 
obviously dangerous risk of buying drugs from an 
anonymous Internet drug dealer. See, e.g., Souza v. 
Squaw Valley Ski Cmp., 138 Cal. App. 4th 262, 
266-67, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 389 (2006). 
* * * 
CONCLUSION 
The court giants the motion to dismiss without 
prejudice. The plaintiff must file any amended 
complaint within 21 days. 
This disposes of ECF No. 13. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: 1*41] November 26, 2017 
Isl Laurel Beeler 
LAUREL BEELER 
57 Opposition to Motion to Dismiss·- ECF No. 15 at 26. 
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